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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and since it contained the material elements of a cause of action.
The court also found that a liberal construction of the complaint
would not result in any substantial prejudice to the defendant.
Decisions which failed to give full effect to the merger of
law and equity often did so on the theory that a complaint framed
in equity might deprive the defendant of his right to a trial by
jury if plaintiff was found entitled only to legal relief.145  Here,
the court pointed out that with the enactment of CPLR 4103,
however, possible prejudice in the loss of a right to a jury trial
has been eliminated. 14 6
Liberalized pleading rules not intended to give courts "carte
blanche" to create causes of action by contorting
complaint's language.
By eliminating the pleading technicalities of the CPA and
by providing for a liberal construction of pleadings, the CPLR
did not intend "that the court contort the language of the pleadings
to create one or more causes of action. .... ,, 147 Recognition of
such intent is evident in Shapolsky v. Shapolsky. 4s  In this
action, plaintiff alleged misappropriation of funds and conversion
of corporate assets. The court held that while such allegations
might give rise to a shareholder's derivative suit, the complaint
was too vague in that it failed to show plaintiff's standing to
bring suit in his individual capacity. Plaintiff's demand for an
accounting by each defendant "for all dividends and distributions
to which plaintiff is entitled . . ." was held indefinite since the
complaint failed to allege whether or not the dividends had actually
been declared. Finally, the court held the allegation of non-
delivery of stock certificates by corporate defendants insufficient
because the complaint failed to show how plaintiff became entitled
to such shares.
Thus, Shapolsky indicates that despite the liberalized pleading
requirements under the CPLR, the complaint must meet the minimal
requirement of informing the defendant and the court of the material
elements of the action and of the relief sought.
Further indication that the liberalized pleading requirements
are not to be construed as a "carte blanche" is set forth in Flamingo
145 See generally Walsh, Merger of Law and Equity under Codes and
Other Statutes, 6 N.Y.U.L. REv. 157 (1929); Kharas, A Century of Law-
Equity Merger in New York, 1 SYRAcusE L. REV. 186 (1949).
148 CPLR 4103 provides in part: "When it appears in the course of a
trial . .. that the relief required, although not originally demanded by a
party, entitles the adverse party to a trial by jury of certain issues of
fact, the court shall give the adverse party an opportunity to demand a jury
trial of such issues ... "
1473 WEiNSTEiN, KORN & MImLER, NEW YoRK CivI. PRAcrxcE 113013.03
(1963).
14822 App. Div. 2d 91, 253 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1st Dep't 1964).
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Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp.1 40 The complaint
alleged that defendant had misappropriated plaintiff's common-law
property rights, which were grounded on a written agreement
with a third party concerning a motion picture film. The appellate
division held that the complaint failed to comply with CPLR 3013
in that it did not allege what constituted the rights of the licensor
to the film, whether the public was deceived or confused, or any
indication that the film was not in the public domain. The court
indicated that because of the unsettled state of the law with
respect to republication of motion pictures, the pleadings should
be sufficiently particular to apprise the court and the adverse party
of the precise problem involved.
It is essential for the practitioner to realize that while the
courts will construe pleadings in conformity with the liberal
philosophy of the CPLR, they will not uphold a pleading which
fails to indicate that the plaintiff is entitled to recover on some
legal theory. Liberalized rules are not an excuse for poorly-
drawn or sloppy pleadings. To comply with CPLR 3013, a
pleading must be drawn up with sufficient precision to enable
the parties to adequately prepare their cases and to enable the
court to control the case.
Sham no longer ground for dismissal of irrelevant matter.
In a recent case, the Oneida Special Term granted plaintiff's
motion to dismiss an affirmative defense and certain denials
contained in an answer on the ground of sham. The appellate
division, upon review, ruled that "there is no longer a motion
to strike as sham under the CPLR." 150 Accordingly, they reversed
special term as to the denials in the answer. However, since the
affirmative defense alleged "no facts . . . sufficient in law," 151
it fell within the province of a 3211(b) motion (failure to state
a defense) and the dismissal was upheld on that ground.
The appellate division's ruling is consistent with the letter
and intent of the CPLR. Rule 103 of the Rules of Civil Practice,
which permitted a motion to strike specific matter from a
pleading on the ground that it was a sham, 5 2 was superseded by
3024(b) of the CPLR, 53 which permits the striking of only
scandalous or prejudicial matter unnecessarily inserted in the plead-
ing. Apparently the striking of matter from a pleading for any
other purpose has been eliminated by the CPLR.
21922 App. Div. 2d 778, 254 N.Y.S2d 36 (1st Dep't 1964).
150 Chicago Dressed Beef Co. v. Gold Medal Packing Corp., 22 App. Div.
2d 1010, 254 N.Y.S.2d 717 (4th Dep't 1964).
'
5 1
rd. at 1010, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
252See PRAsnxm & TRAtANI, Naw Yoim PRAcricE 449 (4th ed. 1959).
Rule 104 is the rule which authorized the striking of the whole answer or
reply.153 Rule 104 of the RCP has been omitted in the CPLR.
195]
